Application of Leftover Hash Lemma to Public Key Encryptions Based on Conjugacy Search Problem (New contact points of algebraic systems, logics, languages, and computer sciences) by 山村, 明弘
Title
Application of Leftover Hash Lemma to Public Key
Encryptions Based on Conjugacy Search Problem (New
contact points of algebraic systems, logics, languages, and
computer sciences)
Author(s)山村, 明弘




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Application of Leftover Hash Lemma to Public Key
Encryptions Based on Conjugacy Search Problem $*$
Akihiro Yamamura
Akita University
1-1, Tegata Gakuen-machi, Akita 010-8502 Japan
yamamura@ie.akita-u.ac.jp
Abstract
We show aws in a one of public key encryptions based on conjugacy
search problem which has fatal aw and apply the leftover hash lemma
to remedy.
1 Flaws CSP-EIG
Three public key encryptions, CSP-EIG, CSP-hElG and CSP-CS schemes,
are proposed by L.Wang, L.Wang, Z.Cao, E.Okamoto and J.Shao in Inscrypt
2010 [7]. Each scheme is claimed to have certain provable security. It is
reported a fatal aw in CSP-EIG and indicated that there are more erros
in the design of the other two schemes in [8]. In this paper, we review the
results obtained in [8] and consider the future research problems.
Let $M$ be $a$ (not necessarily commutative) monoid. We denote the set
of invertible elements $x$ of $M$ by $G(M)$ . The conjugacy search problem is to
nd an element $9\in G(M)$ such that $f=9^{d_{9^{-1}}}$ for given $d,$ $f\in M$ provided
that such an element $g$ exists.
Suppose that $d\in M$ and $g\in G(M)$ and the order of $g$ is $n$ . If the order
of 9 is innite, then $n$ is specied to be a large enough. The CSP-DDH
problem is a decisional problem to decide whether or not $f=9^{a+b}d9^{-(a+b)}$
for given $d\in M,$ $g\in G(M)$ , $g^{a}dg^{-a},$ $9^{b}d_{9^{-b}}$ and $f=g^{c}dg^{-c}$ , where $a$ and
$b$ and are randomly chosen from $\{$ 1, . . . , $n\}$ and either $c$ is randomly chosen
from $\{$ 1, . .. , $n\}$ or $c=a+b$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ . We say that the CSP-DDH
assumption holds for $M$ if there is no ecient algorithm to answer correctly
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$to\frac{1}{2}$
.
a CSP-DDH problem instance with probability non-negligibly larger than
The CSP-EIG scheme is dened as follows. Let $K=\{g^{a}dg^{-a}|1\leq$
$a\leq Ord(g)\}$ , where $Ord(g)$ stands for the order of the element $g$ . Suppose
$H:Karrow P$ is a cryptographic hash function. Let $P$ be the message space
$\{0, 1\}^{k},$ $C$ the ciphertext space $K\cross P$ . Alice picks $a(1\leq a\leq Ord(g))$ and
publicizes $g^{a}d_{9^{-a}}$ . Bob picks $b(1\leq b\leq Ord(g))$ and encrypts a message
$m\in P$ by
$c=(9^{b}dg^{-b}, m\oplus H(g^{b}(g^{a}dg^{-a})g^{-b}))$ .
Receiving the ciphertext $c=(c_{1}, c_{2})$ , Alice decrypts it by $m=c2\oplus H(g^{a}c_{1}g^{-a})$ .
Theorem 1 of [7] claims that the CSP-EIG scheme is indistinguishable
against chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model. On the other hand,
we must not assume an random oracle in the standard model, and so we
may not assume $H$ is a random oracle. We shall see that if $H$ is a random
oracle, the scheme is indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks and
a random oracle is vital in the CSP-EIG scheme and this disproves Theorem
1 of [7].
We choose two messages $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ from $P$ . One of them is chosen by
coin toss and it is encrypted as $c$ then we are asked to decide whether $c$ is
a ciphertext of $m_{1}$ or $m_{2}$ . First, we dene a cryptographic hash function $H$
to be
$H(m)=SHA-1(m)|O$ . (1.1)
The value of $H$ is the concatenation of the value of SHA-I(m) and a bit O.
Then $H$ is a cryptographic hash function of hash size 161 bits and satises
collision resistance, pre-image and second pre-image resistance, while it is
not a random oracle because the last bit is always $0$ and so the hash value
is not random.
Let $P=\{0, 1\}^{161}$ . Take $m_{1}$ as any message with the last bit is 1, and
$m_{2}$ as any message with the last bit is O. Then the ciphertext of $m_{1}$ is given
by
$c=(g^{b}dg^{-b}, m_{1}\oplus H(9^{b}(g^{a}dg^{-a})g^{-b}))$ .
The last bit of the second entry is 1 since the last bit of $H(g^{b}(g^{a}dg^{-a})g^{-b})$
is O. The ciphertext of $m_{2}$ is
$c=(g^{b}dg^{-b}, m_{2}\oplus H(g^{b}(g^{a}dg^{-a})g^{-b}))$ .
Similarly the last bit of the second entry is $0$ since the last bit of $H(9^{b}(g^{a}dg^{-a})g^{-b})$
is O. Therefore an attacker can always distinguish the ciphertexts of $m_{1}$ and
$m_{2}$ with probability 1. This shows that the CSP-EIG scheme is not indis-
tinguishable in the standard model and disproves Theorem 1 of [7].
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2Gennaro, Krawczyk and Rabin's Method
We recall Gennaro, Krawczyk and Rabin's method to obtain a uniform dis-
tribution over the set $\{0, 1\}^{s}$ of the xed length bit strings from DH trans-
forms over non-DDH groups for preparation for our xing the CSP-EIG
scheme. The ElGamal encryption is indistinguishable against chosen plain-
text attacks provided a generator $g$ is chosen adequately and the base group
enjoys the DDH assumption. However, $g$ may be chosen inadequately and
its order may be insucient in length in real-life systems. For example, SSH
and IPSec standards instantiate groups in which the DDH assumption does
not necessarily hold. Even in such a case, the ElGamal scheme still enjoys
provable security under the so-called $t$-DDH assumption introduced in [3].
We recall necessary terminology. Let $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ be random variables with
support contained in $\{0, 1\}^{n}$ . The statistical distance between $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ is
dist $( \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})=\frac{1}{2}\sum_{x\in\{0,1\}^{n}}|Prob(\mathcal{X}=x)$ {Prob$(\mathcal{Y}=x$
Now suppose $\mathcal{X}_{n}$ and $y_{n}$ are probability ensembles. Let $\mathcal{D}=\{D_{n}\}$
be a family of circuits. Then $\mathcal{X}_{n}$ and $y_{n}$ are called computationally in-
distinguishable (by non-uniform distinguishers) if for every polynomial-size
distinguisher family $\mathcal{D}$ , for every polynomial $P(\cdot)$ and for suciently large
$n$ we have
$| Prob_{x\in \mathcal{X}_{n}}(D_{n}(x)=1)-Prob_{y\in \mathcal{Y}_{n}}(D_{n}(y)=1)|\leq\frac{1}{P(n)}.$
Let $\mathcal{X}_{n}$ be a probability ensemble over $A_{n}$ . The $\min$-entropy of $\mathcal{X}_{n}$ is
dened to be
$\min-ent(\mathcal{X}_{n})=m\dot{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}n_{x\in A_{n}:Prob_{x\in \mathcal{X}_{n}}(x)\neq 0}(-\log(Prob_{x\in \mathcal{X}_{n}}(x)))$ .
Let $\mathcal{G}=\{G_{n}\}$ be a family of cyclic groups. We say that $t(n)-DDH$
assumption holds over $\mathcal{G}$ if for all $n$ there exists a family of probability
distributions $\mathcal{X}_{n}(x^{a}, x^{b})$ such that
1. $\min-ent(\mathcal{X}_{n}(x^{a}, x^{b}))\geq t(n)$
2. The probability ensemble
$\mathcal{D}\mathcal{H}_{n}=\{(x^{a}, x^{b}, x^{ab}|a, b\in U\{1, \ldots, Ord(G_{n})$ }}
is computationally indistinguishable from the ensemble
$\mathcal{R}_{n}^{*}=\{(x^{a}, x^{b}, C|a, b\in U\{1, \ldots, Ord(G_{n})\}$ and $C\in_{\mathcal{X}_{n}(x^{a},x^{b},x^{ab})}G_{n}$ },
where $Ord(G_{n})$ stands for the order of the group $G_{n}.$
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The notation $x\in \mathcal{D}$ $A$ is to be read as $x$ is chosen from $A$ according to
the distribution $\mathcal{D}$ , and $x\in US$ means choosing $x$ uniformly from the set
$S$ . The probability distributions $\mathcal{X}_{n}(x^{a}, x^{b})$ may be dierent for each triple
$x,$ $x^{a},$
$x^{b}$ . Intuitive meaning of the assumption is that a DH output $x^{ab}$ has
some degree of unpredictability.
2.1 Universal hashing
Universal hashing was introduced by Carter and Wegman [2] in 1979 and
has been a basic technique in many areas of information security. It real-
izes pseudorandom generators, privacy amplication and derandomization.
Universal hashing is formed by orthogonal arrays and error correcting codes,
and so on [6]. Leftover hash lemma was given by Impagliazzo, Levin and
Luby [5] and has many applications together with universal hashing. See
also [1]. We use universal hashing to correct one of public key encryptions
based on conjugacy search problem proposed in Inscrypt 2010 [7].
Suppose $h:\{0, 1\}^{n}\cross\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}arrow\{0, 1\}^{m(n)}$ is a function. For each xed
$Y\in\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ we have a function $h_{Y}(\cdot)=h(\cdot, Y)$ that maps $n$ bits to $m(n)$
bits. Then $h$ is called $a$ (pairwise independent) universal $ha\mathcal{S}h$ function if for
all $x_{1},$ $x_{2}\in\{0, 1\}^{n}(x_{1}\neq x_{2})$ and for all $a_{1},$ $a2\in\{0, 1\}^{m(n)}$ , we have
$Prob_{Y\in U\{0,1\}^{l(n)}}$ $(h_{Y}(x_{1})=a_{1}$ and $h_{Y}(x_{2})=a_{2})= \frac{1}{2^{2m(n)}}.$
Leftover $ha\mathcal{S}h$ lemma is introduced and used to construct pseudorandom bit
strings in [4] and used to smooth distributions in [3]. See also [1] for a recent
development of the leftover hash lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (Leftover hash lemma [4]) Let $\mathcal{X}_{n}$ be a probability ensem-
ble such that $m\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} n-ent(\mathcal{X}_{n})=m(n)$ . Let $e(n)$ be a $p_{0\mathcal{S}}itive$ integer valued
parameter. Let $h$ : $\{0, 1\}^{n}\cross\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}arrow\{0, 1\}^{m(n)-2e(n)}$ be a universal hash
function. Let $X\in \mathcal{X}_{n}\{0, 1\}^{n},$ $Y\in U\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ and $Z\in U\{0, 1\}^{m(n)-2e(n)}.$
Then we have
dist $( \langle h_{Y}(X), Y\rangle, \langle Z, Y\rangle)\leq\frac{1}{e(n)+1},$
where $\langle$X, $Y\rangle$ stands for the concatenation of $X$ and $Y.$
Using the leftover hash lemma, Gennaro et al. [3] show that if $\mathcal{G}=$
$\{G_{n}\}_{n}$ is a group family in which the $t(n)$-DDH assumption holds and
$h$ : $\{0, 1\}^{|G_{n}|}\cross\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}arrow\{0, 1\}^{t'(n)}$ is a universal hash function, where
$t'(n)=t(n)-\omega(\log n)$ , then the induced distribution of $h(g_{n}^{ab}, Y)$ for $a,$ $b\in U$
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$\{1, 2, \cdots, Ord(G_{n})\}$ and $Y\in U\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ is computationally indistinguish-
able from the uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}^{t'(n)}$ even when $h,$ $9_{n}^{a}$ and $9_{n}^{b}$
are given to the distinguisher. This implies that the ElGamal scheme using
the hashed value $h(9_{n}^{ab}, Y)$ instead of $g_{n}^{ab}$ to mask a plaintext is indistin-
guishable if the underlying group satises $t(n)$-DDH assumption. In this
case the universal hash function is common knowledge between Alice and
Bob and $Y(\in\{0,1\}^{l(n)})$ is a piece of a ciphertext.
3 Revised CSP-EIG scheme
In [8], CSP-EIG scheme is revised. Suppose $t(n)$ CSP-DDH assumption
(one of a concrete instance of the $t(n)$ MA-DDH assumption) holds for $M,$
$d\in M,$ $g\in G(M)$ and $h$ : $\{0$ , 1 $\}^{|M_{n}|}\cross\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}arrow\{0, 1\}^{t'(n)}$ is a universal
hash function. A public key is a pair $(g,g^{a}dg^{-a})$ . A plaintext $P\in\{0, 1\}^{t'(n)}$
is encrypted as
$(Y,g^{b}dg^{-b}, P\oplus h(Y_{9^{a+b}}dg^{-(a+b)}))$ ,
where $Y\in\{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ . In this case, the universal hash function $h$ is publicized
and $Y(\in U\{0,1\}^{l(n)})$ is a piece of a ciphertext.
We have the following the theorem. The reader is referred to [8] for
detail proof.
Theorem 3.1 The revised CSP-ElG scheme is indistinguishable against
chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model if the $t(n)-CSP-DDH$ as-
sumption holds.
4 CSP-hElG and CSP-CS
In addition to CSP-EIG, CSP-hElG and CSP-CS are proposed in [7]. The
authors claim the schemes have provable security. However, it is no longer
trustworthy after CSP-EIG has a security aw. The missing argument is
that the authors in [7] did not tell random oracles from collision resistent
hash functions. In the case of CSP-EIG, we use the universal hash functions
to remedy. It is plausible to use the same method to remedy CSP-hElG
and CSP-CS. On the other hand, the proof of the security for CSP-hElG
and CSP-CS would be extremely harder than that of CSP-EIG and so we
may need some more idea. It is also necessary to obtain more algebraic
systems with computationally hard CSP problem. Furthermore, the study
of universal hashing is also of signicance.
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